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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to derive the structure of optimal
multilateral contracts in a costly state verification model with mul-
tiple agents who may be risk averse and need not be identical. We
consider two different verification technology specifications. When the
verification technology is deterministic, we show that the optimal con-
tract is a multilateral debt contract in the sense that the monitoring
set is a lower interval. When the verification technology is stochastic,
we show that transfers and monitoring probabilities are decreasing
functions of wealth. The key economic problem in this environment
is that optimal contracts are interdependent. We are able to resolve
this externality problem using abstract measure theoretic tools.
'Address of the authors: Department of Economics, University of Illinois, L206 South
Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science foundation (SES
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1 Introduction
In the Arrow- Debreu model complete insurance markets exist and agents
are able to attain unconstrained Pareto efficient consumption allocations. In
addition, the structure of the set of financial securities that support these
allocations is indeterminate (i.e., the Modigliani-Miller Theorem states that
a firm's debt-equity ratio is irrelevant when there are no market imperfec-
tions). Casual observation and systematic study, however, suggest that firms
have determinate debt-equity ratios and that insurance markets are incom-
plete. The costly state verification model, proposed by Townsend (1979),
provides one plausible explanation of these outcomes that is consistent with
(constrained) Pareto efficient behavior. In particular, Townsend introduces
an information friction into the Arrow-Debreu model with two essential ele-
ments. First, agents have asymmetric information. That is, all agents know
the (common) distribution of random variables (i.e., endowments) in the
economy, but the realization of a particular agents random variable is cost-
lessly observed only by the agent himself. Second, a technology exists that
can be used to publicly announce the realization to all agents ex post, but
it is costly to use the verification technology. This model has proved useful
for analyzing two general classes of economic problems: The case where the
verification technology is deterministic and the case where it is stochastic.
When costly state verification is deterministic (i.e., monitoring occurs
with either probability one or zero), Townsend proves that the optimal
contract that supports (information and resource) constrained Pareto effi-
cient consumption allocations resembles debt because the monitoring set is a
"'lower interval." That is, it is optimal to monitor all announcements below
a certain cut-off point, and these outcomes are interpreted as states of costly
(but efficient) bankruptcy. All announcements above the cutoff point arc not
monitored, and these outcomes are interpreted as states of solvency. The
lower interval result establishing the optimality of debt is important because
it is consistent with many stylized facts observed in actual markets. 1 For ex-
ample, it is consistent with the prevalent issue of debt by firms, its payment
characteristics, and key institutional features of bankruptcy procedures.2
Unfortunately, existing lower interval results have been established only
under several restrictive assumptions: Agents are either assumed to be risk
neutral or their trades are exogenously restricted to be symmetric, separable
in endowments, and bilateral. Townsend (1979, p. 281) notes that these re-
strictions are "unpleasant'
1 because they are motivated by technical, rather
than economic considerations. Further, they may preclude optimal risk shar-
ing arrangements even in two-agent contracting problems. 3 More fundamen-
tally, however. Boyd and Prescott (1987) argue that coalitional structures
are important for understanding many economic phenomena. 4 For exam-
ple, Boyd and Prescott (1986) study explicitly multilateral contracts which
(p. 217) "condition the consumption allocations of [agents] on group experi-
ence as well as on observables for individual(s)." Their model (with adverse
selection and two types of agents) gives rise to welfare-improving financial
intermediary coalitions which exhibit key characteristics displayed by actual
intermediaries. Boyd and Prescott (p. 231) note: "An extension which is not
so easy [in their model] is to allow for more than two agent or project types. 11
As we discuss in Section 5, such an extension may prove to be straightforward
in our framework.
bovver interval results are also obtained by Gale and Hellwig (1985), but they assume
that only the agent who pays for monitoring gets the information. The distinction between
public and private monitoring does not matter in a two agent economy, but it is important
when there are many agents. See Williamson (1986) and Krasa and Villamil (1990) for
multiple agent costly state verification environments with private monitoring reports.
2We discuss relevant aspects of US bankruptcy procedures in Section 5.
3Townsend (1979, p. 281) provides an example where two agents have utility functions
of the form ii(c) = cQ+l /(a + 1), where — 1 < a < 0. The optimal symmetric transfer
function implied by this common utility specification is not separable in endowments as
required by the exogenous restriction.
'Wilson (19(38) also argues that group, i.e., syndicate, structures are important in
finance and insurance problems.
The second class of problems that the costly state verification model has
proved useful for analyzing are environments where the verification technol-
ogy is stochastic (i.e., monitoring need not occur with probability one). In
this case the optimal contract that supports (information and resource) con-
strained Pareto efficient consumption allocations specifies transfer and mon-
itoring procedures that resemble those commonly used by insurance com-
panies and tax revenue collection agencies. That is, the optimal contract
has transfers and monitoring probabilities that are monotonically decreas-
ing functions of an agent's reported wealth. Border and Sobel (1987) prove
this result in a model with stochastic monitoring, two risk neutral agents
(one having a random endowment of wealth), and information conditions
that are identical to those in Townsend's model. However, Border and So-
bel note (p. 533) that their arguments "use risk neutrality in an essential
way" and that "it is not known if the monotonicity result . . . extends to
the risk averse case.'" This open question seems particularly important for
insurance applications of the model as risk aversion is typically thought to
be the driving force behind most insurance arrangements. Further, we argue
in Section 4 that the multilateral framework is important for many (costly)
auditing problems.
The monotonicity result establishing the optimality of transfers and mon-
itoring probabilities that are monotonically decreasing functions of agents'
wealth reports is important because it is consistent with the following styl-
ized facts. In insurance markets, a large loss can be viewed as a low wealth
realization. Thus, a monotonic contract implies that policy holders receive
higher transfers when they claim larger losses, and the probability of being
audited is correspondingly higher for such reports. Border and Sobel (1987,
p. 531) note that the tax interpretation of the monotonicity result is umore
subtle." Taxes can be viewed as negative transfers and low wealth reports
can be viewed as high itemized deduction claims. Thus, the monotonicity
result implies that larger (total) tax payments are associated with larger
wealth reports, but the probability of a tax audit is decreasing in reported
wealth. The key insight is that a low wealth claim, not low wealth itself,
makes a tax audit more likely.
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the costly state verification
model to resolve the difficulties noted by Townsend and Border and Sobel
that preclude its application to economic problems involving risk aversion
and/or multiple agents (e.g., financial intermediation, insurance, and tax
problems). Thus, we specify a model with multiple asymmetrically informed
agents who have access to a costly state verification technology. We study
the nature of contracts that support (information and resource) constrained
Pareto efficient consumption allocations in the model when contracts are not
restricted a priori to be symmetric, bilateral, or separable in endowments, and
agents may be risk averse. We show that even in this more general environ-
ment, "debt-like" securities remain optimal when the monitoring technology
is deterministic (i.e., the optimal multilateral contract has a lower interval),
and transfer functions and monitoring probabilities remain monotonically
decreasing functions of wealth when the monitoring technology is stochastic.
We use abstract measure theoretic arguments to derive the form of the
optimal contracts in our more general economic setting. The key problem
when agents are risk averse and contracts are explicitly multilateral is that
non-trivial interdependencies among agents exist. Thus, strong measure the-
oretic tools such as the Isomorphism Theorem (cf., Section 3) and Lusin's
Theorem (cf., Section 4) appear to be necessary to solve this interdepen-
dency problem. These tools allow us to change contracts in such a way that
only the expected utility of one agent is affected while the expected utility
of all other agents remains the same. We are then able to show that given
any arbitrary initial contract, unless we start with lower intervals as moni-
toring sets (when monitoring is deterministic), or monotonically decreasing
transfer and monitoring functions (when monitoring is stochastic), at least
one agent can be made better off, which contradicts the (constrained) Pareto
optimality of the arbitrary initial contract. These results are stated formally
in Theorem 1, and Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, respectively.
2 The Model
Consider a two period exchange economy with finitely many individuals
indexed by i = l,...,n. Each trader is described by a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, u t-, which is defined over second period con-
sumption, C{, and a random endowment, A',. Let u t be concave and mono-
tonically increasing in consumption. Further, assume that the Xt are inde-
pendent random variables. Denote the particular realization of AT, by x t , let
F{ be the distribution of A,, let Fn be the joint distribution of X\, . .
.
, Xn ,
and assume that all distributions are non-atomic. 5 Finally, to ensure non-
negative consumption, assume that the support of F
l
is contained in [ra,oo),
where m > 0. The information conditions in our model are the same as those
in the Townsend (1979, p. 281) costly state verification model. Each agent i
privately observes the realization of his/her endowment, A',, ex-post, but all
agents have access to a costly state verification technology that can be used
to publicly announce the realization to all other agents.
Let 0,(-) be the cost incurred by agent i from using the verification
technology. 6 Denote by i,-(ari, . . . ,arn ) the net transfer function of agent i,
which describes the payment between the coalition and each agent i. This
payment may be positive (indicating a state-contingent payment from the
coalition to the agent), negative (indicating a payment by the agent to the
coalition), or zero. Throughout our analysis we assume that agents' ver-
ification costs are an arbitrary positive function of the transfer payments,
<t>i(t ,{•)). Because transfers need not be identical across agents, verification
5 A distribution is non-atomic if every single point has probability zero. This follows
automatically if the distribution has a density.
"Verification is perfect in the sense that after monitoring occurs the true endowment
is publicly reported without error.
costs may differ as well. Townsend (1979, p. 269) considers two verification
cost specifications, and our cost function includes both as special cases. In
his first case, the verification cost is a fixed constant, and hence independent
of the actual realization. In the second case, the verification cost of agent i
depends on the transfer t t , where the costs are strictly monotonic.
Resources are allocated in this economy via binding contracts. At time
zero, agents have the opportunity to write contracts to provide for consump-
tion next period. The structure of optimal contracts that emerge depends on
the specification of agents' preferences, the distributions of random variables,
the verification technology, and the nature of information in the economy.
Three alternative ex-post information conditions are possible:
• When <p l (t l (-)) — for i — l,...,n, there is costless, and consequently
complete public information about the realization of each X
t
ex post.
When agents have identical utility functions and weights and if the X
z
are identically distributed, it follows that
Ci(XU X n )= -JtXi,
for all i — l,...,/2. See Caspi (1978, p. 270, Theorem 2) for a formal
proof of this result for the core.
• When (f>i(t t (-)) = oo for i = 1, . . . ,n, information is infinitely costly, so no
verification is undertaken and information about each .V, remains com-
pletely private. The optimal multilateral contract which is individually
rational in this case is autarky.
• In the remainder of the paper, we characterize the nature of optimal
multilateral contracts under deterministic and stochastic verification, re-
spectively, when information need not be entirely private nor public/
'Townsend (1979, p. 273) provides an example which indicates that non-trivial solu-
tions exist in the costly state verification model with deterministic monitoring. Townsend
(1988) contains a systematic numerical analysis of the costly state verification model with
both deterministic and stochastic monitoring.
3 The Case of Deterministic Verification
In this section we study the form of Pareto efficient multilateral contracts
that arise among agents under deterministic monitoring. Note that transfers,
£,(•), can be contingent only on endowment realizations of agent i which are
publicly verified. In private information states, all transfers must be non-
contingent. Let Si denote the set of all announced realizations of X{ for
which verification occurs, and let Sf denote the complement of Si. We begin
by defining a multilateral contract for this economy.
Definition 1. ,4 multilateral contract with deterministic verification for
each agent i = 1. . . . , n is a pair (t
t , Si), where ti(x\, . . . , xn ) is a net-transfer
function for agent i from 1Rn into JR and S
t
is a set of endowment realizations
announced by agent i for which monitoring occurs (with probability one). If
agent i is verified, the endowment becomes public information.
We restrict the analysis to the class of incentive compatible contracts
which we define as follows:
Definition 2. A collection of multilateral contracts (£,-, Si) with determin-
istic verification is incentive compatible if 5, = 5, and £,(•) = £,(•) for every
i — 1,. . . ,n, where (£,-, Si) denotes the pre-state contractual commitment and
{t
t ,St ) denotes the post-state outcome.
Definition 2 indicates that under an incentive compatible contract, agents
do not misrepresent their private information (i.e., pre-state commitments are
fulfilled ex post). Townsend (1988, pp. 416-418) uses a revelation principle
argument to prove that incentive compatibility can be imposed without loss
of generality. The following conditions generalize the incentive compatibility
specification of Lemma ").l in Townsend (1979):
ICl) Xi >—> t,{xi /-, v n ) is constant on Sf, for a.e. Xj, j ^ i.
(IC2) U(xi,.. .,Xi,... ,xn ) - (f>i(ti{-))) > t l {xu ...,y,. . . ,xn )); for a.e. x t e Si,
for every y € 5t
c
,
and for a.e. Xj, j ^ i.
ICl says that when agent fs endowment announcement is not verified
(ceteris paribus), his/her net-transfer is constant. This follows from the fact
that agent z's transfer cannot depend on private information. IC2 says that
it is (at least weakly) optimal for agent i to request verification when the
endowment realization is in the verification set. Thus, it ensures that agent i
requests verification when x
t 6 Si. To avoid distraction from the main point
of our analysis (i.e., the structure of optimal contracts) we refer the reader to
Section 5 for a discussion of implementation, alternative specifications, and
institutional interpretations of the incentive constraints.
We now state an information constrained optimization problem whose so-
lutions characterize optimal multilateral contracts. The objective is to choose
Pareto efficient net transfer functions, ti{X\, . .
.
, Xn ), and sets of endowment
realizations for which verification occurs, Si, to maximize a weighted average
of agents' utilities, subject to feasibility and information constraints. The A,
denote weights on agents' utility functions.
Problem 3.1. Choose t
t
and S
t for i = 1, . . . ,n to maximize
- fH-W " ! M^ij- •!*»»)] dFn (x x ,...,xn ), (3.1)
i=i
subject to
< Ci < Xi + U(xi,...,xn ) - (f>i{ti(-)) a.e. for all i, (3.2)
n
5> <0 a.e., (3.3)
i=i
t
t
is incentive compatible for every i (3.4)
Si is a measurable set for every i
.
(3.5)
The optimal multilateral contract maximizes the expected utility of all
agents (3.1), subject to: (3.2) a budget constraint for each agent which holds
9
almost everywhere; (3.3) an aggregate feasibility constraint which holds al-
most everywhere; (3.4) incentive-compatibility conditions ICl and IC2; and
(3.5) a standard measurability condition.
The purpose of this section is to characterize the nature of optimal con-
tracts when verification is deterministic. Our main result is that (con-
strained) Pareto efficient multilateral contracts have lower interval monitor-
ing sets, except for nullsets. That is, we show that there exists a f t such that
S
t
— [ra, 7,) for all i, except for a set of measure zero, where the lower interval
may be trivial. Because monitoring is deterministic, it follows immediately
from this result that the transfer function is constant for all x
t 6 Sf (for
fixed xy, j ^ i). As we noted at the outset, Townsend (1979, p. 283) proves
a related lower interval result under several exogenous restrictions which he
describes as "unpleasant" because they are necessary for technical reasons,
but are not motivated by economic considerations. Specifically, he assumes:
(i) all transfers and verification costs are symmetric;
(ii) all trades are bilateral; and further
(iii) when both agents are verified, the transfer function is separable in en-
dowment realizations (i.e., in our notation t(xi,X2) — M-r i) + M-r 2))- 8
Before beginning our formal analysis we describe the relationship between
our result and Townsend's, and give an overview of the proof of Theorem 1.
Townsend specifies an optimization problem which involves the maxi-
mization of a weighted average of utilities, subject to information and re-
source constraints. However, instead of characterizing t
t
and S
t
directly
as in our Problem 3.1, Townsend reformulates an analog of Problem 3.1
as a standard constrained maximization problem. The key difference be-
tween our approaches is that the maximizer in his reformulated problem
is a function of only one variable. This follows from restrictions (i) and
(iii), as they immediately imply that the transfer function is of the form
Separability is equivalent to the slope of the net-transfer function of agent i depending
only on agent Ts realization. This precludes most interesting externalities between agents.
10
t(xi,X2) = t(x\) + t(x2). Hence, under these restrictions it is only necessary
to choose a one-dimensional transfer function, t. Townsend considers the
multilateral case (pp. 278-283) but reduces it to a similar one-dimensional
problem by using (ii). This approach has two limitations. First, it precludes
certain types of agent heterogeneity (i.e., (i) rules out transfer and cost func-
tion differences). Second, even when agents' transfer and cost functions are
identical, restrictions (ii) and (iii) preclude certain economically plausible
risk-sharing arrangements as noted in the Introduction.
In contrast, we characterize the solutions to Problem 3.1 directly. The
maximizers in our problem are explicitly multi-dimensional transfer functions
and verification sets, where transfer and verification cost functions need not
be symmetric. We use abstract measure theoretic arguments to obtain our
results, and these mathematical tools appear to be essential in our more
general setting. We proceed as follows: Our main result in this Section is
Theorem 1, which establishes that in a multi-agent economy with determin-
istic costly state verification, nil solutions to Problem 3.1 have lower interval
verification sets (except for sets of measure zero). We prove the Theorem
indirectly by assuming that there exists some arbitrary initial contract (£,-(' )i
Si) which is optimal but is not a lower interval. We then define a measure
preserving mapping, which we denote by g, which allows us to transform the
transfer functions, monitoring sets, and monitoring costs associated with the
initial contract into an alternative contract (/', S'
t
) such that the new con-
tracts are feasible, incentive compatible, strictly increase the expected utility
of at least one agent, and leave the expected utility of all other agents unaf-
fected. This contradicts the optimality of the original (non-lower monitoring
interval) contract, hence it establishes the optimality of contracts with lower
monitoring intervals.
Roughly speaking, we contradict the optimality of non-lower intervals
in the following way. We move a part of the original (non-lower interval)
11
monitoring set of one of the agents (say agent one) to the left, mapping
it into a set where there was previously no state verification. Such sets
(with positive measure) always exist if the initial contract was not a lower
monitoring interval to begin with, and we construct these sets to be compact.
The existence of a measure preserving one-to-one mapping, g, between these
two sets follows from the Isomorphism Theorem which we state below. The
Isomorphism Theorem says that measure preserving one-to-one mappings
exist between all separable and complete measure spaces (where both spaces
have the same measure). Since compact subsets of JR are separable and
complete (in the induced topology) the Theorem can be applied.
Feasibility and incentive compatibility of the alternative contract are
straightforward to show because g is measure preserving and one-to-one. It
is also reasonably straightforward to show that the expected utility of agent
one increases by a Rothschild and Stiglitz increasing risk argument. Town-
send (1979, p. 288) uses a similar a-gument in the proof of Proposition 3.2,
which is his lower-interval result for two-agents, one risk neutral, with fixed
monitoring costs. Thus, the reader may wonder why we use abstract measure
theory to obtain our results. Recall that the remaining and key step in the
proof is to show that the utility of all other agents does not decrease under the
alternative contract. In Townsend's proof (which does not require measure
theory), this follows immediately from risk neutrality and fixed verification
costs. 9 In our setting with multiple risk-averse agents and arbitrary verifi-
cation cost functions his argument breaks down exactly at this step because
all contracts are interdependent. Hence without an additional argument, it
is not possible to avoid affecting other agents' expected utility nor to see in
'Townsend (1979, p. 287, Proposition 3.1) proves a second lower interval result for
a bilateral contracting problem where agents may be risk averse and the monitoring cost
function is convex with c\(0) < 1. However, the Euler equation argument he uses to obtain
his result depends crucially on restrictions (i), (ii), and (iii). It does not appear to us that
this Euler equation approach can be readily extended to the multilateral case because of
the interdependence' problem.
12
which direction their utilities change. Measure preserving mappings impose
the necessary structure to overcome this problem.
We begin our analysis by defining a measure preserving mapping. As
indicated above, this concept is crucial for the arguments that follow.
Definition 3. Let (Y{, /?,•,//,• ), i = 1,2 be two measure spaces and let g: \\ —
Y2 be a measurable function. For every A E (32 define gA = {ga: a E A}.
Then g is measure preserving iff H\[g~
l A) = ^{A).
The following Remark is an immediate consequence of Definition 3. id
Remark 1. Let f be an integrable function on Y'2 , and let g be a measure
preserving transformation as defined above. Then Jog 11 is integrable and
the following holds:
f f(.v)dfl2 (x)= I f(g(.v))d^
JY2 JY\
Remark 1 corresponds to Theorem 1.6.12 of Ash (1972) or Remark 28.14
of Parthasarathy ( 1977). For completeness we give the proof in the Appendix.
This Remark is essential for the proofs of our main results as it establishes
that whenever we change the payoffs to one agent in a measure preserving way
(i.e., choose a measure preserving function g), then the expected utility from
an arbitrary initial contract ^(A'i, Xn ) and a transformed alternative
contract t
t (g(Xi)), A' 2 , . . . , Xn ) is the same for all other agents.
Consider the following example of a measure preserving mapping. Let Y\ = [0, 1] U 2
and Y-> = [1.21. On both sets consider the standard Lebesgue measure. Then the function
. . f x + 1 if xe [0,1];
'
(l) =
tl if. = 2;
is measure preserving in this example (though not a one-to-one mapping).
u fog is the composition of/ and <j, i.e. / o <j(x) = f(g(x)).
13
To construct measure preserving mappings we use the Isomorphism The-
orem from measure theory (cf., Parthasarathy (1977) Proposition 26.6).
Isomorphism Theorem. Let Y
x ,
i = 1,2, be complete and separable metric
spaces, and let fi z be non-atomic Borel measures on Yx such that ^{Y\) =
piYz) > 0. Then the two measure spaces are isomorphic, i.e., there exist
two sets of measure zero, Nt , i = 1,2, and there exists a measure preserving
transformation, g: Y\\N\ h— V^V^. whose inverse exists and is also measure
preserving. 12
We now state our main result concerning the nature of optimal contracts
in a multi-agent economy with deterministic costly state verification.
Theorem 1. Assume that the utility functions of all agents are twice con-
tinuously different iable and that u" < 0. Let the endowments of the agents
be described by independent random variables X t for all i, = l,...,n. Then
all solutions to Problem 2.1 have lower interval verification sets, except for
sets of measure zero (i.e., there exists a ~( t such that S{ A {X t : X t < 7,} has
measure zero.) 13
Proof. We proceed indirectly. Without loss of generality, assume that the
monitoring set of agent one is not a lower interval. Let fi be the distribution
of the endowment of agent one. Then there exist compact sets A',, i = 1,2
with positive measure, and such that k\ < k 2 for all k\ E A, and such
that K\ C 1R \ S\ and A'2 C S\. By regularity 14 and non-atomicity of the
measure, we can assume that fi{I\\ ) = f.i( A 2 ). Note that the K t are separable
and complete because they are compact. Thus, by the Isomorphism Theorem
""\" denotes set theoretic subtraction.
13
"A" denotes the symmetric difference: A A B = (.1 \ B) U (B \ A), for arbitrary sets
A and B.
14 Regularity means that fi(A) = mf{/<(0):0 D A. O open} = sup{//(F):F C A, F
closed}. Our measure // is regular, since every probability measure on a metric space is
regular (cf.. Parthasarathy (1977) Proposition 19.13).
1 1
there exists a measure preserving mapping h: K X \N\ —> K2\N2 such that h~ l
exists and is also measure preserving, where JV,-, i = 1,2 are sets of measure
zero. Note that h can be extended to IR by
(h(x) if are A'i\Wi;
g{x)= I h~ l {x) iixeK2 \N2 ;
^ x otherwise.
Clearly, g is again measure preserving.
Recall that U(xi, . . . ,.r n ) are transfer functions associated with some ar-
bitrary initial contract, where the monitoring set of agent one is not a lower
interval. Thus for every agent i, now define new transfers t\ by
t'i(xi, c„) = ti(g(x 1 ),x2 , ...,xn ).
Further, define the new monitoring set of agent one by S[ — g~ x {S
x ) and
S\ = St for i = 2, . .
.
, n. The strategy of the proof is to show the following:
(i) The transfer functions associated with the new contracts (^(-),5') are
feasible; (ii) the new contracts are incentive compatibles (iii) the utility of
all other agents i ^ 1 does not change; and (iv) the utility of agent one
strictly increases. This gives the contradiction to the assumed optimality of
a non-lower interval contract, (i)-(iv) are proved as follows:
(i) Let A = {(xi,..., sB ): EJU *,(*!,..., x„) > 0}. Define g on Rn by
(xi, . . . ,xn ) h-> (g(x x ), x 2 , . . . , .r n ). Clearly, g is measure preserving with re-
spect to the joint distribution of the A',. Then, g~ 1 A = {(yi, • . ,yn )'- g{yi) —
*\\ <li - %i for all i > 1, and Yli=iU(x\, r„) > 0} = {(y 1 yn ): such
that J2?=i U{g{y\),y2i •> Un) > 0}. Since g is measure preserving, (3.3) im-
plies that g~ 1A has measure zero. Hence,
^2ti(g(xi),x 2 in ) < a.e.
which proves feasibility.
15
(ii) Incentive compatibility requires ICl and IC2 to be fulfilled. ICl
is obvious. Let i{(xi, .
.
.
,
Xi-i,Xi+ii • • • ,xn ) denote the constant payment to
agent i in non-monitoring states. We first show that IC2 is satisfied for i > 2,
(the argument is similar to that given for (i)). Define g as above, but now let
A = {(xi, . .. ,xn ):t t {xu . . .,xn ) - <j)i(t(xi, . .
.
,
xn ) < U{xu . . . ,xn )}. Then it
follows that g~lA = {(x 1 ,...,xn ):ti (g(xi),...,xn ) - &(%(xi), . . . , xn )) <
ti(g(xi),.
.
. ,xn )}. Since g is measure preserving, IC2 implies that g A has
measure zero. Hence IC2 holds for the new contract for all agents i > 2. It
remains to give the proof for i = 1. This, however, follows immediately from
the argument for i > 2 and the fact that
iife £n) = sup ti{g{yx ),..., xn )
= sup t 1 (y1 ,...,xn ) = t1 (x2 ,... 1 xn ),
because g is one-to-one. This proves (ii).
(iii) Apply Remark 1 and Fubini's Theorem (cf., Ash (1972), Theo-
rem 2.6.4). Let c' denote consumption under the new contract, and let c
t
denote consumption under the original contract for agent i. Note that for
every i / 1 we have c,((/(x 1 ), ,r 2 , . . . , x n ) = c't {xu . . . , x n ). We must show
that / u t (c{) dF n — J u,(c') dF n , which means that the expected utilities are
the same. This follows from Fubini's Theorem since
JJ J
Ui ( C{ (g ( Xi )' 'r '2, • • -> xn))dFi(xi )dF2 {x2 ), .
.
.
dFn {xn )
=
JJ
I Ui{ci{x l ,x2 ,...,xn))dFi(xi)dF2 (x2 ) ...dFn {xn ).
Equality follows from Remark 1, i.e., the fact that g is measure preserving.
This proves (iii).
(iv) For given (x2 , r n ) define
/Ui) = ti(xi r„) - o, (/,(./-! v n )).
16
Because of IC1 and IC2, transfers (net of monitoring costs) in monitoring
states are always higher than transfers in non-monitoring states, g moves
these high transfers to the left (i.e., to low income states) and vice versa. 15
By Lemma 2 in the Appendix, agent one is strictly better off under the new
contract. This contradicts the assumed optimality of the original contract,
proving the Theorem.
4 The Case of Stochastic Verification
In this section we study the form of Pareto efficient multilateral contracts
that arise among agents under stochastic monitoring. We begin by defining
a multilateral contract for this economy.
Definition 4. .4 multilateral contract with stochastic verification for each
agent i = l,...,n is a pair {t
t ,p t ), where ti(x\, . . . ,xn ) is a net-transfer
function for agent i from H n into M, and /),: [m,oo]" —* [0, 1] is a function
which indicates the probability that agent i 's endowment announcement is
verified. If agent i is verified, the endowment becomes public information.
Alternative formulations of the stochastic monitoring problem have been
studied previously by other authors. In particular, Townsend (1988, p. 424)
reports the results of systematic numerical analyses of costly state verification
economies with stochastic monitoring and gives examples of non-monotonic
monitoring probabilities. His results stem from the fact that the monitoring
probability function, p,-, in his model is defined on [ra,oc]. That is, whether
or not an agent is verified depends only on the agent's own announcement,
and is independent of all other agents' announcements. 16 In contrast, in our
15That is /(A-]) < /(£_>) for every k
x G K\ and for every k? G AV This is exactly the
condition specified in Lemma 1 under which Lemma 2 holds.
"'Townsend's example is for a discrete (hence atomic) distribution. However, because
it is an equal distribution our proof immediately goes through (but it breaks down for
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model monitoring depends on the agent's own endowment announcement and
on the announcements of all other agents (i.e., pi is denned on [ra,oo]
n in
Definition 4). We believe that this specification is reasonable for the stochas-
tic auditing applications of the model described at the outset. For example,
the probability of a tax audit by the IRS is related not only to an individual's
own income tax return, but also to the returns filed by all other individuals
in the economy. 17 Finally, Border and Sobel also prove a monotonicity result.
However, as we noted in the Introduction, their arguments depend crucially
on risk neutrality.
Our main goal in this section is to characterize the solutions to an infor-
mation constrained optimization problem with stochastic monitoring. How-
ever, before beginning our formal analysis we first discuss an inherent diffi-
culty that emerges in economies with stochastic monitoring and risk averse
agents. 18 The problem stems from the fact that stochastic monitoring gener-
ates additional uncertainty into expected consumption allocations, and this
additional uncertainty decreases the expected utility of risk averse agents.
The key problem is that states with low endowment realizations are the same
states where the probability of monitoring is the highest. Further, these high
variance states are precisely the states of most concern to risk averse agents.
In general it is difficult to precisely characterize the marginal loss of utility
to an agent from the additional uncertainty caused by stochastic monitoring.
Transfers which are contingent not only on all agents' endowment realizations
discrete distributions which are not equal distributions). We are not aware of an example
where the "discreteness" is solely responsible for the non-monotonicity.
''That is, an individual with a university salary is more likely to be audited in a small
college town (Urbana, IL) than in the Silicon Valley (Palo Alto, CA).
18 Randomness is inherent in the monitoring technology considered in this Section. Thus,
one may interpret the optimal consumption allocations derived from Problem 4.1. as
"consumption lotteries." However, they differ from the consumption lotteries considered
in Prescott and Townsend (1984) where lotteries are introduced as a device to obtain a
concave programing problem.
19 Note that stochastic monitoring also has the countervailing beneficial effect of reducing
expected monitoring costs (relative to deterministic monitoring).
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(as they are in our model), but also on whether or not monitoring is actually
performed (which does not occur in our model) might ameliorate the negative
utility effects associated with stochastic monitoring somewhat. However, it
is unlikely that such transfers would eliminate these effects entirely.
We consider two polar cases which are designed to address the "marginal
utility loss" problem experienced by risk averse agents. We first consider the
case where monitoring costs are borne by each individual agent, but restrict
agents' utility functions to be separable in consumption and monitoring cost.
This approach is often employed in the literature (e.g., Moohkerjee and Png
(1989)), hence we use it in the statement of Problem 4.1 below. However,
our proofs also apply to an alternative specification where agents are able to
diversify their individual specific monitoring cost risk. That is, our results
also hold for the case where (if monitoring occurs) the monitoring costs of
agent i are borne by all other agents i ^ j. We defer discussion of this
second specification until after we have proved our main results (Theorem 2
and Corollary 1 ).
We now state the optimization problem for this economy:
Problem 4.1. Choose £,(•) and p t (-) for i — 1, . . . ,n to maximize:
£ A, f[vi (xi + *,-(.)) - Pi(-)MU)} dFn (xu rB ), (4.1)
subject to
< c, < Xi + t t (xx, . . . ,.r n ) a.e. for all i, (4.2)
n
J^ti < 0, a.e. (4.3)
Vi(x % + U{xu . . . ,Xi, r n )) - pi(xi xn )<j>i(ti(-)) >
(1 - pi(xi,...,y xn ))vi(xi + t(x\ y r„))
+ Pi{xi y, Cn).fat(O) - <t>i{U)]> for all i,
for all y, and for a.e. x t ; and (4.4)
1!)
< Pi{xi,.. . ,xn ) < 1, for every x t . (4.5)
Equation (4.1) reflects the consumption and monitoring cost separability re-
striction described previously. Separability implies that each agent's utility
from consumption is independent of the non-pecuniary (effort cost) imposed
on the agent by the monitoring procedure. Loosely speaking, the idea is that
the monitoring process causes no additional utility or disutility other than
the direct costs. Equation (4.3) is the same as in Problem 3.1. Equation
(4.4) is the incentive compatibility constraint under stochastic monitoring. 20
The left-hand side of (4.4) is the expected utility of agent i from truthfully
reporting endowment realization a:,-; and the right-hand side is the expected
utility of agent i from announcing any other realization y ^ x\. When agent
i misreports and is verified, he/she receives a zero transfer and the entire
endowment is confiscated, so utility is v,-(0) — 0,(^(-)) in this case. We have
implicitly assumed that it is optimal to punish an agent as much as possible
(which in this case means seizing the entire endowment) for misreporting.
This, however, is straightforward to show since maximizing the penalty min-
imizes the propensity to cheat. We again refer the reader to Section 5 for
further discussion of incentive compatibility. Finally, (4.5) states that the p l
are probabilities.
We now give an overview of the proof of Theorem 2. This Theorem shows
that the transfer function associated with the optimal contract is a decreasing
function of wealth when monitoring is stochastic. As in Theorem 1, we
proceed indirectly: Assume that the transfer function of one agent (say agent
one) is not a monotonically decreasing function of wealth over the entire
support of the distribution. We again wish to use the Isomorphism Theorem
to find a measure preserving one-to-one function <j which maps arbitrary
initial contracts into an alternative contract which is "more monotonic." 21
!0Townsend (1988, pp. 416-418) uses a revelation principle argument to prove that this
restriction can he imposed without loss of generality.
In general it is not possible (even for very simple cases) to construct a monotonic con-
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We show that this "more monotonic" alternative contract: (i) is feasible;
(ii) is incentive compatible; (iii) does not decrease the expected utility of all
other agents; and (iv) strictly increases the expected utility of agent one.
This establishes the optimality of contracts with monotonically decreasing
transfer functions.
The first step of the proof, since the argument is indirect, is to estab-
lish a uniform violation of (decreasing) monotonicity of an arbitrary initial
(non-monotonic) transfer function. We begin by showing that it is possible
to find two compact sets with positive measure, denoted U and V, where U
is strictly to the left of V, and such that all values of the transfer function
in U are strictly below the values which the transfer function assumes in V.
To construct such sets, we use Lusin's Theorem (cf., Parthasarathy (1977)
Proposition 24.21 and Corollary 24.22), which says that for any integrable
function (on a complete and separable metric space) there exist arbitrary
large compact subsets of the domain such that the restriction of a function
on this compact subset is continuous. We use this continuity to establish the
desired (uniform) violation of monotonicity of the transfer function on U and
V . The main insight in this part of the proof is that it is not sufficient to
establish a violation of monotonicity of the transfer function for single points
as the analysis necessarily excludes sets of measure zero. Hence, starting
with two points z1? z2 for which monotonicity is violated, we must establish
a violation which also holds in the neighborhood of these two points. For
continuous functions this is obviously always the case. Fortunately, Lusin's
Theorem implies that this is also true almost everywhere for arbitrary mea-
tract directly with a measure preserving transformation. Consider the following Example:
Choose the interval [0, 1] with the standard Lebesgue measure. Let f(x) = x(l — x). Now
assume (indirectly) that there exists a measure preserving transformation g on [0, 1] such
that / o g{x) = g(x){\ — g{±')) is monotonic. The function is quadratic, so there are still
always two solutions x t , i — 1,2 to any equation x( L — x) = r. Hence, there exist x\ ^ xo
such that f o g{x\) = J og(x->). Assume that x\ < x->. Since / o </ is monotonic, / is con-
stant on the image of the interval [f[,/ 2 ] under g. This, however, means that g([xi,x 2 ])
contains at most two points. This is a contradiction to g being measure preserving.
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surable functions (by continuity of such a function on compact subsets).
The remainder of the proof is similar to Theorem 1: We apply the Isomor-
phism Theorem to get a measure preserving one-to-one mapping h between
the arbitrary initial (non-monotonic) contract and a (more monotonic) al-
ternative contract, on the two compact sets U and V. We then show that
(i)-(iv) hold. The strategies of the arguments for (i), (ii), and (iii) are very
similar to those used in Theorem 1. However. Lemma 1 in the Appendix
is used to show (iv) and (in contrast with Lemma 2 used in Theorem 1) it
requires h to be continuous. Fortunately we can again appeal to Lusin's The-
orem to show the continuity of h (i.e.. continuity of h follows immediately
from Lusin's Theorem on .4 C U and B C V). Since monotonicity is only
violated in neighborhoods of Z\ and z<i denoted by A x C and B x C we only
apply the mapping h for values of z2 j • • • xn which are in C. This defines a
measure preserving mapping g on IRn .
We now state our main result concerning the nature of optimal contracts
in a multi-agent economy with stochastic verification.
Theorem 2. Let (U,Pi) for i = 1 n be a collection of Pare to optimal
contracts. Then there exists a set of measure zero N such that for every agent
i and for every z x — [x\, . . . , £,-, . . . , x n ), and z 2 = {i'\ y t , . . . , x n ) with
Z\,z2 E IR
n \N it follows that t{{z\) > ^(22) if x i < Vi, i-e., the transfers are
monotonically decreasing a.e.
Proof. We proceed indirectly. Without loss of generality we can assume that
the transfer function of agent one is not monotonic a.e. Let U be the union
of all open sets with measure zero. Then U itself is open and has measure
zero. By Lusin's Theorem (cf. Ash (1972). Corollary 4.3.17(b)) there exists
for every c > 0. a compact subset K C IRn with //(//? \ l\) < £ and such
that /j is continuous on A'. Without loss of generality we can assume that
U D Kn = (otherwise take I\ n \U). Hence, we can construct an increasing
sequence of compact sets K, such that ^ is continuous on each of the I\\ and
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such that JRn \U^i K% nas measure zero. Since t\ is not monotonic a.e. there
must exist Z\ = (a?i, x 2 , . . . ,xn ), and z2 = {yi,X2, j xn) such that Xi < yl5
and ^i(-i) < ^1(^2)5 an(i sucn that 21, 22 £ U^Li A'n . For a sufficiently large n
we can assure that Z\,z2 E A'n . Since <i is continuous on A'n , monotonicity
is also violated in a neighborhood of z\ and 22- Therefore we can choose a
compact neighborhood U of X\ in H; a compact neighborhood V of y x in #?
which is strictly to the right of U; and an open neighborhood C of (x 2 , . . . , x n )
in /Rn_1 such that monotonicity is violated for U X C and V x C (i.e., for
every v
x
= (cii , c2 , . . . , cn ) E U xC and for every v2 = (&i , c2 , . . . , cn ) E V x C
it follows that £i(t>i) < ^ 1 ( t'2 ) ) •
Because of the regularity of the measure we can choose U and V such
that n(U) = fJ>{V). Further, U and V are neighborhoods, hence they must
have positive measure (since their intersection with U is empty). By the
Isomorphism Theorem there exists a measure preserving mapping h: U —> V,
such that the inverse of h exists and is also measure preserving except for
nullsets Nu C U and Ny C V. Let U' be compact subsets of U \ Ny with
positive measure (such a subset exists because of regularity). Since U' is
a complete and separable metric space, Lusin's Theorem can be applied.
It therefore follows that there exists a compact subset A of V with positive
measure and such that h is continuous on .4. Let B = h(A). Since the inverse
of h exists and since A is compact it follows that h is a homeomorphism
between .4 and B (we need continuity of h for Lemma 1). Now define
{(h(xi),x2,...,xn ) if x E .4 x C;
(}r 1 (xA ),x 2 r„) if x E B xC]
(xi , .r 2 , . . . , xn ) otherwise.
Then g is a measure preserving transformation on IHn . We now define new
transfers denoted by £;(<7(a?i., x2 , cn )) and new monitoring probabilities
denoted by Pi{g{-i'\, x 2 , . . . , x n )), and show that these new contracts are: (i)
feasible, (ii) incentive compatible, (iii) preserve the utility of all agents 1' ^ 1,
(iv) increase the utility of agent one.
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(i) Feasibility follows as in the proof of Theorem 1.
(ii) Incentive compatibility requires (4.4) to be satisfied. There are three
possible cases. First, assume the true realization (xj, . . . ,xn ) lies in B x C
.
If it is profitable to cheat in this situation under the alternative contract,
then it must also have been profitable with the initial contract in state
g~ l (xi, x 2 , . . . , xn ). This follows from the fact that the transfers are the
same under the two contracts but under the initial contract the endowment
of agent one was lower and hence the penalty if detected cheating was less
severe. However, this contradicts incentive compatibility of the initial con-
tract. Second, assume the realization lies in A x C . If it is profitable to cheat
in this situation under the alternative contract, then it must have been even
more profitable under the initial contract as the transfer was lower. However,
this again contradicts optimality of the initial contract. Finally, for all other
realizations the two contracts are the same. This proves (ii).
(iii) The expected utility of all other agents remains unchanged as in
Theorem 1.
(iv) Agent one is strictly better off by Lemma 1 (since we exchange high
transfers to low income states and vice versa) and the fact that monitoring
probabilities are reduced under the alternative contract. This proves the
Theorem.
The following Corollary follows immediately from Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 it follows that Pi{zi) >
p(c 2 ). '•€., the probabilities of verification are monotonicalhj decreasing a.e.
in endowments.
Proof. The Corollary follows immediately from the fact that the transfers
are monotonically decreasing: Let x
x
< y x . Consider two endowments Ci =
U'i i'n) and :2 — (j/i>£2? . . . ,xn ), and assume that monotonicity of the
probabilities is violated for agent one. By Theorem 2, we have that M~i) >
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t\(z2 ). Now choose the same probabilities of monitoring for z\ and z 2 , and
suppose it were profitable for the agent to cheat in some other state and
announce z2 . Then it would be at least as profitable to announce Z\ since
the transfer is at least as high and the probability that cheating is detected
is lower. However, this contradicts incentive compatibility of the original
contract. Hence Pi(~i) > pi(z2 ).
We conclude this section by discussing the alternative monitoring cost
specification described before the statement of Problem 4.1. That is, instead
of assuming that each risk averse agent i privately bears the entire "utility
loss"' stemming from stochastic monitoring, Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 con-
tinue to hold if we assume that a mechanism exists whereby the monitoring
costs of agent i are borne by all agents j ^ i (when monitoring occurs). This
follows from the fact that steps (i). (ii) and (iii) from the proof of Theorem 2
remain valid under either specification of the model because the transfers
and monitoring probabilities have the same expected value and the same
distribution (although we did not use this fact in the proof of Theorem 2
because of the assumed separability of the utility function). Examples of
mechanisms in actual economies which appear to be qualitatively similar to
this second (publicly borne) cost specification are tax surcharges (levied by
a government) or a reduction in the "dividend credits" commonly rebated to
policy holders by insurance companies (e.g., TIAA-CREF and many other
insurance companies follow this practice).
5 Discussion of Results and Extensions
In this paper we generalize the costly state verification model to allow risk
averse agents who need not be identical ex ante to write multilateral con-
tracts. Bilateral versions of the model have proved useful for many economic
applications, and we believe that this multilateral extension will expand the
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class of economic problems that can be addressed in this framework. Of
course, whether a problem is best analyzed in a bilateral or multilateral con-
tracting framework depends on its underlying economic structure. However,
a multilateral version of the model seems necessary for many types of insur-
ance problems and certain types of financial intermediation problems (cf.,
Boyd and Prescott (1986)). In the remainder of this section we will discuss
the implications of our results and extensions.
We first focus on the incentive compatibility constraint used in our anal-
ysis. Townsend (1988) notes that in order to justify this restriction in costly
state verification models it is necessary to formulate the underlying revela-
tion game. This works as follows: Contracts are written before uncertainty is
revealed. Uncertainty is then privately revealed, and each agent sends a mes-
sage (i.e., reports a state). Thus, agents play a Nash game in messages where
each agent has beliefs over whether all other agents tell the truth. When the
analysis is restricted to truth-telling equilibria, it therefore follows that each
agent expects all other agents to tell the truth. In such a framework the
point-wise incentive constraints commonly used in costly state verification
models follow. This formulation implicitly contains a great deal of commu-
nication among agents, in the sense that decisions are made based on the
expected announcements by all other agents.
The other extreme that we now consider is a game with no communica-
tion among agents. We are concerned with two issues. First, what are the
implications of such an environment for the form of the incentive constraints.
Second, which environment (one with communication or one with no com-
munication) seems most plausible for the economic problems which motivate
this paper. We begin with the first issue. In a game with no communica-
tion among agents, each agent makes an announcement with no knowledge
of other agents' announcements. This corresponds to a Harsanyi (1967) type
Bayesian Nash game, where the incentive constraints need not hold point-
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wise but only in expected value. 22 Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 immediately
go through under this alternative formulation of the constraint because we
do not use incentive compatibility in any essential way in the proof. Rather,
we need only check that it remains satisfied. 23 From a technical point of
view, this step of the proof requires us to show that our construction does
not move us out of the set of all incentive compatible contracts—and this is
of course easier to show if the constraint set is bigger. Thus, the expected
value form of the incentive constraint does not change the structure of the
optimal contract in an environment with stochastic monitoring. In fact, it
facilitates the technical arguments necessary to prove the result.
In contrast, in Theorem 1 we again check that incentive compatibility
conditions IC1 and IC2 are satisfied in step (ii) of the proof, but we also use
these conditions in step (iv) in an essential way. In particular, we use them in
(iv) to show that the transfer in every non-monitoring state is always higher
than the transfer in every monitoring state. Thus, the final step in the proof
of Theorem 1 does not go through with an incentive constraint which holds
only in expected value. In fact, it turns out that under the mathematically
weaker expected value constraint, the transfers associated with the optimal
"For example incentive constraint IC1 would be written:
ti(xi Xi,... ,xn )dF(xu . . . , x,_!,x ! + 1 xn )
is constant on S^; and IC2 would be written:
ti(xi,...,Xi,...,xn ) - 4>()dF(x u . . . , j,_i, x l + i xn )
> / U(x y,... ,xn)dF(xx, .. .,Xi-i,Xi+i, . . .xn );
!
for all n £ Si and for every y € Sf. In both cases dF() denotes integration with respect
to the joint distribution of the random variables Xj, j ^ i. Unlike in the pointwise
specification, these constraints need only hold on average.
To check this use the same argument as in step (ii) of the proof of Theorem 2, and
take the expected value.
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contract need no longer be constant on the non-monitoring set. We first
show this in a simple (but not pathological) example and then provide an
economic interpretation of the result.
Example 1. Consider a discrete distribution and two agents where agent
one is risk neutral and agent two is very risk averse. The same kind of exam-
ple also goes through for continuous distributions and if one agent is (slightly)
risk averse. Assume that there are four states which occur with equal prob-
ability. The endowment of agent one is given by (7,7,3,3) and of agent two
by (7,3, 7,3). Clearly, the two endowments are independent. Let <f> be the (in
our example constant) monitoring cost. Choose Si = and 52 = {3}, i.e.,
agent one is never monitored and agent two is monitored in the low state.
Then Pareto optimal contracts are given by
^i =
— 1 2 = (2 + c, —2, 2 + c, —2),
since under this contract agent two is completely insured, i.e., consumption
is state-independent (net of monitoring costs). However, agent one's net-
transfer is not constant even though the agent is never monitored. Incentive
compatibility for agent two is straightforward. Incentive compatibility for
agent one is fulfilled in expected value: Assume that agent one gets the high
realization. Then the expected net transfer is c/2. This is the same expected
net-transfer the agent would get in the low state. The argument goes through
even if agent one is slightly risk averse because this arrangement economizes
on monitoring costs: Choosing Si — {3} increases monitoring costs by a
discrete amount since monitoring is deterministic.
Some readers may be tempted to construe Example 1 as refuting the
optimality of debt even under deterministic verification. We regard this in-
terpretation as misguided. As Townsend (1987, p. 382) notes, the motivation
for an analysis such as our Theorem 1 is to "begin with some striking ar-
rangement [e.g, debt] in an actual economy and ask whether any theoretical
environment might yield such an arrangement . . . without making the [model]
too complicated or implausible." We view the question— is a model with an
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expected value incentive constraint better than a model with a point-wise
constraint?—to be methodologically equivalent to the question—is a model
with stochastic monitoring better than a model with deterministic monitor-
ing? In our opinion the answer is clearly no. Mathematical generality is not
the desideratum per se, rather it is the consistency of the structure and results
of alternative models with those observed in actual economic environments
which determines which model is more appropriate for the problem at hand.
In fact, the appropriateness of the point-wise constraint appears to be
directly linked to the appropriateness of deterministic monitoring. Both
specifications seem to be consistent with key institutional features of US
bankruptcy procedures. 24 When a firm petitions for bankruptcy protection
under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, a trustee is appointed by the
court. This trustee is bound by law to give a full account of the status of
the claims owed by and to the insolvent firm by every individual involved in
transactions with it. Formally, this corresponds to the game with commu-
nication which leads to the (point-wise) incentive constraints ICl and IC2.
Thus, even though an insolvent firm's creditors are likely to have information
about the firm's assets, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits them by law from
attempting to secure direct payments from the firm or from those who owe
payments to it. One interpretation of the co-existence of different institutions
is that there are different equity versus efficiency tradeoffs in bankruptcy and
auditing problems. Perhaps society is willing to pay a higher price for fair-
ness in bankruptcy settings because all agents are potentially subject to a
random shock which could render them insolvent.
Finally, we conclude by discussing the Boyd and Prescott problem noted
in the Introduction, i.e., the nature of optimal multilateral contracts in
-
>4See White (1989) for a detailed discussion of the corporate bankruptcy decision in the
US. Note that we take the procedures associated with Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy
Code as given. An analysis of why these particular legal structures have emerged is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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economies with additional information imperfections such as adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard. Recently, Boyd and Smith (1990) have introduced
adverse selection into the (deterministic) costly state verification model when
contracts are restricted to be bilateral and agents are risk neutral. Agent
heterogeneity is clearly essential for such problems, and our model permits
agents to differ on several different dimensions (i.e., preferences, (endowment)
distribution functions, transfer functions, and monitoring cost functions need
not be identical). Thus, we believe that our multilateral results will be ro-
bust even when these additional imperfections are introduced. However, this
remains for future research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Remark 1. Let t be a simple function on Y2 , i- e -^ there exist
A
t E 02, and A, £ IR such that t = ^Z I= i A»l>i,-, where
1 x 6 At ;
otherwise.
Then t(g(x)) = £?=1 A,Vm»- Hence,
U-(*) =
{
/ t{g{x))dp l (x) = Yi \ i f Ir-x Ai {x)dli l (x) = ^X iti l {g' 1Ai )JY
*
t =i JYi i=i
= £A.7*a(A) = £A t-/ l Ai {x)dti2{x)= I t(x)d(i2 (x),
t=x ,-=i JY* Jy i
where the third inequality follows from the fact that g is measure preserving.
Since the Remark holds for all simple functions, it also hold for all integrable
functions. 25
Lemma 1. Let ft bt a measure on IR and let A, B be two compart subsets
of IR with the same measure. Let f be an integrable function on IR . Assume
25This is a standard approximation argument in measure theory: All integrable functions
can be approximated by simple functions.
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that a < b, and f(a) < f(b), for every a G A, and for every b G B. Let g
be a measure preserving isomorphism on JR which is continuous on AU B
such that g{A) = B, and such that g(x) — x for every x G IR \ A U B. Then
x + f(g{?)) is less risky than x -f f(x) in the Rothschild and Stiglitz sense
(i.e., every risk averse agent prefers x + f(g(x)) over x + f(x)).
Proof. If the support of fi is compact, and if / is bounded this follows
immediately from the integral condition in Rothschild and Stiglitz. In the
following we implicitly prove the result for the slightly more general condi-
tions of the Lemma 1.
First, note that we can assume that / is continuous since it can always
be approximated by continuous functions. We first prove the Lemma for the
case where /.i is a discrete measure on A and B. We proceed by induction.
Assume that the support of /< on A and on B consists of single points xA
and .rg, respectively. Hence g(x
.\) = xB and g{x B ) — xA It follows that
xa + f(xA ) < x A + f{xB ), and xB + f(xA ) < xB + f{xB )-
Since u is concave it follows that
u(xA + f(xA )) + u(xB + f{xB )) < u(xA + f(xB )) + u(x B + f(xA )).
This proves the Lemma for the case of a single-point distribution.
Proceeding inductively, assume that the Lemma holds for all distributions
that have a support of exactly n discrete points in .4 and B, respectively. We
now give the proof for n+ I. Choose two points xA , and xB in the support of
the measure on A and B, respectively. Let g' be the following transformation
on R: {X \ II X = x A'i
xB if x - xB ;
g(x) otherwise.
Then we can apply the induction hypothesis for g' to get that x + f{g'[x))
is less risky than x + f{x). We can use again the induction hypothesis in
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order to exchange xa and xb and prove that x + f{g{x)) is less risky than
x + f(g'(x)). This concludes the proof for the discrete case.
For the continuous case we use an approximation argument. Let vA
be the restriction of p, on A. We can approximate vA by a sequence of
measures v
A
which converges weakly to vA (cf. Billingsley (1968) Theorem 4
on p. 237). For every n let uB be the image of the measure vA under g (i.e.,
fn(S) = uA (g~ 1 S), for every set S). Then, i/% converges weakly to vB . Let
fin be the measure defined by
iin(S) = ti(S \ Au B) + vi(S n A) + i^(5 n 5),
for every 5. Then by construction g is measure preserving with respect to
(in . Since /i n has finite support on AU B the first step of the proof implies
that
Ju(x + f(g(x)))dn(x)>Ju(x + f(x))dii(x).
Taking the limit for n —* co on both sides and using the continuity of / and
g on A U 5 we conclude the proof.
Lemma 2. Let u be a utility junction which is twice continuously differ-
entiable. Assume that u"(x) < for every x. Let f be integrable and let g
be a measure preserving transformation (not necessarily continuous). Then
Lemma 1 holds with a strict inequality, i.e., the agent strictly prefers the
contract x + f{g{x)) to x + f{x).
Proof. Here we need only check that the integral condition of Rothschild and
Stiglitz holds with a strict inequality, and then use partial integration to show
that the agent strictly prefers x + f(g(x)) (cf., Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970),
footnote 10).
Choose 7_,i such that x + f(x) < jA < x+ f(g(x)), for every x G A. Define
7b analogously. Let F be the distribution of x + f(g{x)) and let G be the
distribution of x + f{x). Then F(t) - G{t) > for every / < "M , with the
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strict inequality holding on a set of positive measure. Further F(t) — G(t) is
monotonically decreasing for 74 < t < 7#, and is monotonically increasing
for every t>^B . Finally, note that F(t) — G(t) = for every t £ AU B. Let
T(y) = Jl^G(t)-F(t)dt. Then
(a) r(oo) = /«[(?,-(*) -fi(a:)]«fe-=0;
(b) r(y) > for m<y < 00.
Conditions (a) and (b) are the integral conditions of Rothschild and Stiglitz.
Let S = F — G. Integration by parts yields
/ u(x) dS{x) =u{x)S{X)\%> - f u'{x)S{x)dx
Jo Jo
=
-u'(.r)T(.r)|-+ r u"{x)T{x)dx, (AA)
Jo
since u(x)S(x)\'<^ = and u(x)T(x)\ K' = by (a). Further, since T is strictly
positive on a set of positive measure, and since u" < it follows that
/•oo
/ u"{x)T{x)dx <0. (A.2)
Jo
(A.l) and (A.2) immediately imply that the agent's utility is strictly greater
under contract x + f(g(x)). This proves the Lemma.
X]
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